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Naming the Tragedy 
Eric T. Freyfogle* 
Since its appearance in 1968, Garret Hardin’s short article in 
Science, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” has become an especially 
handy source for scholars to cite in support of an array of claims 
about nature and why we misuse it.1 In his article, Hardin drew 
attention to the rising human population and offered an explanation 
why, absent intervention, it would keep rising, well beyond the 
planet’s carrying capacity and even when it brought suffering and 
degradation.2 To illustrate his explanatory theory Hardin included a 
tale about a grazing pasture that suffered tragic decline because of 
overuse.3 It was this short, fictional narrative that drew great interest 
and turned Hardin’s article into a classic. 
In Hardin’s story, individual cattle grazers were free to use the 
pasture as they liked. They could add more livestock at any time, 
and do so even when the extra animals caused overgrazing and 
degradation. An individual grazer had an incentive to act this way, 
to add an extra head, because the forage eaten by the animal 
benefited the grazer. The additional animal brought net harm due 
to the overgrazing, particularly as other grazers followed suit. But 
that harm was spread among all grazers while the benefits of the 
extra animal went to the owner alone. Each grazer thus had an 
incentive to act in ways that brought tragic consequences to the 
landscape and its users. For the “rational” grazer, Hardin 
contended, adding more animals was “the only sensible course.”4 
And it was individual freedom that made it all possible. As Hardin 
famously contended, “[r]uin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons.”5 
 
* Swanlund Chair and Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This essay is 
part of a larger project, tentatively entitled A Good that Transcends: Culture Change and Our 
Common Home, forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press. 
1 . Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). A hint of the utility 
of the article can be gained by a search for citations to it in the Westlaw database; a search 
on December 11, 2014, turned up 1,855 items. 
 2. Id. at 1243–44, 1246. 
 3. Id. at 1244. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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Hardin described his grazing region as a commons, and it was, in 
the sense that many people shared its use.6 More precisely the region 
was an open-access commons in that no norms or rules limited the 
ability of any grazer to graze more animals at will.7 The outcome of 
this freedom, Hardin asserted, was tragic in that it led inexorably to 
misuse of the pasture and harm to the grazers themselves. Hardin 
did not pause to define good pasture use; he did not, that is, explain 
how he would distinguish between the legitimate use of a grazing 
region and the misuse of it. His was a simple tale, with no need to 
get specific. At some point, overgrazing reduced the region’s forage 
productivity, an outcome he deemed bad. 
Hardin’s conclusion was that this kind of selfish freedom needed 
to disappear. In some way lawmakers needed to limit it through 
coercive means. As a democrat, Hardin believed that binding limits 
should be “mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people 
affected,” not imposed by autocrats.8 He thus phrased his solution as 
mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon. Coercion could take the 
form of something like governmental regulation. It could also come, 
in the case of the grazing tragedy, through the division of the pasture 
into privately owned shares.9 If the latter was done, the ill effects of 
overgrazing by any individual grazer would be felt by the grazer 
alone, not shared by others, thus aligning the costs and benefits of 
overgrazing and leading, presumably, to less or no overuse. Hardin 
presented these remedial options as variations on the theme of 
mutual coercion, but many readers would treat them as more 
distinct—a public ownership-regulatory option and a private-
property option.10 
Over the years Hardin’s tale has become something of a 
Rorschach test, akin to the personality test developed by Swiss 
 
 6. Id. (describing his fictional pasture as one “open to all”). 
 7.  A classic discussion is Siegfried V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, “Common 
Property” as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975). 
 8.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. Hardin emphasized this point to counter any implication 
that “coercion implie[d] arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats . . . .” Id. 
 9. Id. at 1245 (“The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private property, 
or something formally like it.”). 
 10. Id. at 1247. Taken as a whole, Hardin’s article treats privatization as a form of mutual 
coercion, as it is. But in early parts of his article, before introducing the idea of mutual coercion, he 
presents private property as a solution without describing it in those terms, thus facilitating the view 
that they are different options. Id. at 1245 (“The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted 
by private property, or something formally like it.”); id. (To avert tragedy of commons in National 
Parks “[w]e might sell them off as private property”). 
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psychologist Hermann Rorschach in which patients are shown 
inkblots and asked to describe what they see. In much the same way, 
readers of Hardin’s tale can come away with widely varied 
interpretations. What seems important in this story? What truths are 
displayed? And what omissions or errors might be embedded in it 
and in Hardin’s explanation? 
The possible answers to these questions are many, and very likely 
turn mostly on traits that a reader brings to the narrative. Based on 
answers to such questions one might well discern the political 
leanings of a reader and probably more: his ecological 
understandings, his thoughts about government pro and con, the 
value he places in standard neoclassical economics, and his views of 
private ownership and its benefits. Indeed, one might guess that 
answers from readers could be spread out along a graduated 
spectrum. Does the tale sum up our environmental predicament? Is 
it proof of the value of private property and support for more of it? 
Is it proof of the ill effects of allowing people to act free of control? 
And might it contain still other lessons about human nature, 
economics, and our planetary plight? 
Hardin’s tale is so malleable in part because Hardin presented it 
simply and most readers have reacted with equal simplicity. The 
story, though, can also be teased apart more carefully, with 
particular regard for embedded assumptions and for issues that, 
though raised implicitly, were not flagged or probed by Hardin 
himself. The story, to be sure, has to do with ecological decline. 
But it takes digging to get to the bottom of this story, both to 
figure out why the degradation takes place and what steps the 
grazers (or others) would need to take to avoid the decline. On 
both points—the root causes of degradation and the steps needed 
to avert it—Hardin’s story is radically incomplete. To fill it out is to 
gain considerable insight both on the causes of today’s 
environmental ills and on the reasons why modern society has such 
trouble coming to grips with them. 
I. THREE BASICS 
Readers of Hardin’s tale of all political and cultural stripes ought 
to find agreement on three basic claims about the tragedy. It is useful 
to begin with them before moving on to points that are less clear. 
For starters, the degradation of Hardin’s grazing region was 
caused by the grazers themselves. The cattle, to be sure, ate the 
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plants and fouled the waterways. But the grazers introduced the 
animals and controlled them. People misused the region, not 
bovines. It is an essential point and foundational. In this setting 
and many others, we gain clarity by pointing the finger at the 
people causing the harm, as Hardin did, not at the harm itself. 
Second, few readers are likely to think grazing is always 
ecologically bad, even if they object to treating cattle this way. That 
is, some level of grazing is acceptable in some places. Certain grazing 
entails the legitimate use of nature by people, while grazing at a 
higher level or in the wrong place crosses the line and becomes 
abusive. To figure out whether grazing is excessive thus requires a 
line between legitimate use and abuse. All grazing brings changes to 
a landscape so this line-drawing in effect distinguishes between 
changes made to nature that are acceptable or ameliorative and 
changes that instead are unwise, immoral or otherwise misdirected. 
This line-drawing is very much a normative task, even as it makes 
extensive use of scientific facts. It is up to people to decide, based on 
their values and normative preferences, where the line should lie. 
Nature does not draw it; it merely (and importantly) reacts to what 
humans do. Nor can science alone draw it even as science might tell 
us the consequences of alternative grazing options. 
The third basic lesson embedded in Hardin’s tale is that the 
grazers collectively would be better off if they got together and came 
up with coercive rules limiting their individual uses of the commons. 
Pretty much all readers can see that the grazers ought to do this, and 
that they likely would do it given adequate opportunity. By 
(important) implication, the “rational” decision that a grazer might 
sensibly make acting as an individual—to add more cattle—would 
likely differ from the equally rational decision the same individual 
would make when joining with other grazers to set up a governance 
regime. Working with others the individual could vote to impose 
limits that would keep him from doing exactly what he would 
choose to do as an autonomous individual. 
We need to put the last point plainly: the decision a grazer makes 
as an individual autonomous market actor could differ radically from 
the decision he would likely make in his role as citizen-lawmaker. 
Both decisions reflect what the grazer wants. Both also make good 
sense in simple economic terms; they are, in that regard, 
intellectually coherent. In short, the preferences of grazers—the 
preferences of people generally—vary based on the role they play. 
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This divergence has long been known as the citizen-consumer 
dichotomy.11 It ought to be, but for the most part is not, central to 
nearly all talk about our environmental plight. Similarly, Hardin’s 
tale ought to stand, though it rarely does, as the poster case refuting 
the common claim that people show their true wants when they 
spend their own money as individuals, not when they tell pollsters 
how they would vote. 
II. WHAT IS A COMMONS? 
One hornet’s nest that Hardin stirred up arose from his use of 
the term commons. In the case of population growth, he meant the 
term to refer to the entire planet, which was a commons from the 
perspective of people because they all shared it (albeit in highly 
unequal ways).12 That use of the term drew little objection. What 
became contentious was his use of the term commons to describe the 
grazing region. The pasture was also a commons, but it was one that 
scholars would term an open-access commons, one that grazers 
could use free of any norms or limits.13 There are such commons in 
the world—the atmosphere for the most part, and many fisheries.14 
But long-time grazing commons are typically places where users are 
embedded in collective governance regimes with rights prescribed by 
norms or other rules. Such a place is also termed a commons. As 
scholars pointed out, a well-managed commons of this type would 
produce not tragedy but something more like its opposite.15 It could 
 
 11.  The distinction is explained and applied in MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE 
EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7–8, 51–55, 65–67 (1988). Earlier 
considerations, many in the field of welfare economics, include Stephen Marglin, The Social Rate of 
Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, 77 Q. J. ECON. 95 (1963). 
 12.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1243 (“A finite world can support only a 
finite population . . . .”). 
 13.  The term “commons” is explained in Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 7.  
 14.  On fisheries, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How to Fish: Catch 
Shares and the Future of Fisheries Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150 (2013). In the 
case of the atmosphere, Mary Christina Wood has urged that it be embraced legally as a public trust 
asset with state duties to protect it in the public interest. Mary Christina Wood, Law and Climate 
Change: Government’s Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10652 
(2008). Hardin viewed the atmosphere in the same way, realized that it could not be divided into 
private shares, and urged that mutual coercion be applied to protect it. Hardin, supra note 1, at 
1245, 1247. 
 15.  Leading studies of commons that have been well-managed, sometimes for centuries, 
include ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) and Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A Comparative 
Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resources Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 
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yield maximum benefits for the grazers, better even than if the 
commons were divided into separate geographic shares, with nothing 
like the decline that Hardin predicted. 
This terminology objection, of course, did not really challenge 
anything Hardin had said. Indeed, he had expressly noted that users 
could avoid the tragedy by embracing a coercive management 
system.16 The problem, then, was not with Hardin but with 
simplistic interpretations of this tale, particularly by readers who 
liked the idea of fragmenting nature into privately owned shares. A 
commons led to tragedy while privatization led to lasting 
productivity; that was the simplistic interpretation, one which 
students of real-life, successful grazing arrangements found 
wrongheaded.17 
A more general concern about Hardin’s use of the term looked 
to his implicit claim that a commons was in some way a special kind 
of place. It was a place that had not been divided into private shares. 
When a commons was divided, when each part of it had a distinct 
owner, then it was no longer a commons. Hardin, we might note, 
did not say this exactly. Indeed, his population example pointed in a 
rather different direction, to the view that the entire earth remained 
a commons despite fragmentation into nations and private shares.18 
But again, Hardin’s story was useful to many types of readers and it 
was easy to distinguish, using his grazing tale, between landscapes 
that were divided into private shares and those that were not. Only 
the latter were subject to tragic misuse. 
One objection to this interpretation (that is, to the claim that 
privatization solves the tragedy) is that it overlooks ecological 
interconnections. What happens on one parcel is linked to physical 
conditions elsewhere given flows of air, water, wildlife, and nutrients. 
One landowner is enough to break up a wildlife migration corridor. 
One landowner can alter drainage in ways that substantially disturb 
downward owners. To the extent of interconnections, unseen ones as 
well as the seen, a landscape remains a commons even after its division. 
 
247 (1992). A positive view of the commons is presented in Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of 
Common Ownership, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1359 (2011). 
 16.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. 
 17.  E.g., OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12–13, passim. 
 18.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1243. In addition, Hardin made clear that landscapes divided 
into shares of privately owned land remained a commons with respect to water and air that carried 
away pollution. Id. at 1245. 
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A related objection is that landowners everywhere participate 
routinely in an economic commons when they produce goods or 
services for the market, competing for customers who move about as 
freely as cattle.19 Here we can consider the typical city in which 
owners of gas stations or drug stores compete for customers, 
establishing businesses in new locations in a never-ending quest for 
market share. The competition is plainly wasteful; there is no need 
for similar gas stations or drugs stores adjacent to one another. And 
waste means ecological cost—tragedy—in some place, somewhere. 
Further, people living in the area are forced to drive by the 
competing businesses, and countless ones like them, traveling further 
distances simply to get where they want. City needs could be 
adequately met with fewer gas stations and drug stores, particularly 
abandoned ones. Too many of them populate the urban area, which 
remains a commons, despite its fragmented land ownership, due to 
the flows of goods, services, workers, and customers. 
The same lesson about overuse is illustrated in the cases of oil 
fields and groundwater aquifers. Oil producers can often exploit an 
entire field using only one or a few wells.20 Water pumpers can access 
an aquifer with similar efficiency.21 When the overlying land, though, 
is owned by large numbers of people and each has the right to install 
a well, the number of wells can quickly become excessive and 
wasteful. In the case of oil wells, too rapid pumping by too many 
wells can reduce overall output by releasing pressure too quickly. If 
we view the underlying oil deposit or aquifer as the common asset, 
one can argue that it has not been divided into private shares simply 
 
 19.  The urban setting is considered in Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995 (2012) and Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011). Garnett and Foster pay attention chiefly to the urban spaces that 
are not privately owned. My example considers a city as a whole without regard for ownership of 
particular parts; the city as such remains a commons given the interconnection of its parts and the 
ways the conduct of one actor affects others. A related line of scholarship considers municipalities as 
actors within larger spatial scales. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State 
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012). 
 20.  The typical tools to reduce the waste of too many wells are rules limiting well spacing and 
setting minimum tract sizes for each well, together with unitization procedures that allow for the 
management of entire fields as single production operations. 1 WALTER L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF 
OIL & GAS 267–72 (2004 and 2014 Supp.). 
 21.  Texas is among the states that have sought to reduce inefficiency in groundwater 
extraction—and to conserve water in the process—in part by using well-spacing, well-production, 
and other rules long common in oil and gas fields. See Heather Welles, Note, Toward a Management 
Doctrine for Texas Groundwater, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 483, 491–94 (2013).  
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because the overlying land is fragmented. This is true enough, but 
what it illustrates is that division of lands into private shares almost 
never brings the commons to a full end. So long as private parcels 
are not completely sealed off, with no spillover effects among 
them—including no movement of people or goods among them—
then features of a commons remain. A city remains a commons so 
long as people and their things freely move among competing 
locations, much as oil and water migrate among wells. 
Hardin’s tale, in short, is not usefully read as a story about a 
special kind of place known as a commons, a place distinguishable 
from other places that are privately owned. Pretty much all lands and 
resources face the dangers of tragic misuse whenever and to the 
extent activities unfolding on them trigger effects elsewhere. As for 
sealing off each parcel so that spillover effects end, the idea pushed 
to its fullness is nonsense. People need to come and go, as do the 
goods they produce and need. The health of lands everywhere 
depends on ecological systems and processes that necessarily 
transcend boundaries. To sever or disrupt them is to invite tragedy, 
not avert it. 
Put simply, a commons exists in any setting characterized by 
interconnection and interdependence, whether ecological or social, 
which is to say essentially everywhere. 
III. PRIVATIZATION AS A SOLUTION 
Hardin’s discussion of the solutions to his tragedy is subject to 
more direct challenge because of his too-easy assumption that the 
simple division of the grazing commons would end misuse. Hardin 
did not dwell on the point; he offered the observation mostly as an 
aside. But it was a claim that many readers found congenial, 
particularly readers who disliked government and viewed the market 
as a superior mechanism for resource-use decisions.22 
The falsity of this stance is easy enough to see simply by looking 
to landscapes in private hands. Overgrazing afflicts private lands as 
well as public ones. Private farmlands have long suffered from soil 
erosion and degradation. In the American Midwest, farmers on 
private lands routinely spread fertilizers and pesticides, leading not 
 
 22.  Privatization as the preferred solution is critically considered in OSTROM, supra note 15, 
at 12–15, and Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 
78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 533 (2007). 
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just to topsoil degradation and declines in soil biological diversity 
but to massive problems in waterways (dead zones most vividly). 
Too often owners of private forests have clear-cut them in ways that 
cause soil declines, siltation, fish kills, and other ill effects. 
There are, in fact, a wide range of reasons why owners of private 
lands do not and sometimes cannot take good care of them.23 The 
owners could be unaware of the effects of what they are doing, given 
that many harms are invisible, distant or slow-emerging. They could 
act based on strong competitive pressures or simply know no other 
way to behave. An overall culture of land misuse can exude an aura 
of legitimacy, carried forward by tradition and aided by 
misinformation dispensed retail by (for instance) equipment and 
materiel suppliers. Rational actors could use a discount rate for 
future costs and benefits that lead to exploitation today with the 
proceeds then invested elsewhere in higher-yielding assets. A short 
time-horizon might also be used for other reasons—simply the 
advanced age of the land user, for instance. The reasons are many, 
and have long been known. 
Aside from these general causes of private-land misuses, there are 
the causes that are worsened when the commons is divided into 
smaller shares. Division increases the number and length of property 
boundaries, thus worsening problems related to externalities. Any 
division of a landscape increases the challenges of coordinating land 
uses at large spatial scales so as to address problems that can only be 
remedied at such scales (for example, protecting wildlife 
populations,24 controlling excessive drainage or land-cover change,25 
and managing river floodplains26). To break a landscape into smaller 
pieces adds to these problems, making it even more difficult to 
coordinate activities and lessening the powers of individuals acting 
alone to achieve good land use, even when they try. 
 
 23.  A vivid and thoughtfully probed historical inquiry is DONALD WORSTER, THE DUST 
BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S (1979) (exploring the cultural origins of misuses of 
private lands). I comment on the issue in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH: IMAGES FOR 
OUR PLANETARY SURVIVAL 26–42 (1993). 
 24.  The science and policy challenges of protecting species, particularly imperiled ones, are 
considered in REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE’S LEGACY: PROTECTING 
AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY (1994). 
 25.  One useful inquiry is David K. Mears & Sarah McKearnan, Rivers and Resilience: Lessons 
Learned from Tropical Storm Irene, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 177 (2012). 
 26.  One thoughtful study is J.B. Ruhl, et al., Proposal for a Model State Watershed 
Management Act, 33 ENVTL. L. 929, 931 (2003). 
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The division of an open-access commons into privately 
controlled shares can diminish overuse; that much is true and useful. 
But it by no means ensures good land use and in not insignificant 
ways can make that goal more elusive. The difficulties increase when 
the users acting in concert compare privatization with the option of 
commons governance. In the grazing setting, for instance, herdsmen 
in an undivided landscape can use rotational methods that allow 
them to respond flexibly to variations in range conditions over time 
and give sensitive areas long rests. This option becomes more 
difficult, even infeasible, when a landscape is cut into small pieces. 
IV. THE ONE SOLUTION 
In Hardin’s view, as noted, the solution to the tragedy was 
some version of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon.27A quick 
read of his article, though, can give one the sense that he had two 
solutions in mind, as to some extent he did—government 
ownership with regulatory control and the private property 
alternative. For many readers, these came across as solutions that 
differed in kind, and lots of them much favored the latter.28 
In fact, however, the private-property approach is merely a form 
of mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, and not necessarily much 
different from overtly regulatory approaches. To see this point one 
has to pause to consider how property arises and how it operates 
over time. 
Mythology aside, private property is entirely a social creation.29 It 
arises when a group of people agree among themselves in some 
way—perhaps democratically but perhaps with elites giving orders—
to divide up uses of a landscape in some fashion and to allocate use 
rights to individuals and families or other groups. Property is a 
highly flexible institution in that widely varied things can be subject 
to ownership with rights and limits of ownership that vary just as 
widely. To create a property scheme, then, a law-making community 
needs to make key decisions, especially on the basics: what can be 
owned, how rights will be defined, how norms will be enforced, and 
 
 27.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. 
 28.  Scholarly works strongly favoring privatization include Adler & Stewart, supra note 14 
(for fisheries management), and Jan G. Laitos & Rachel B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503 (2008) (wilderness areas). 
 29.  Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CANADIAN J. 
OF L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1993). 
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what powers lawmakers will retain to change rules over time and to 
reclaim property (expropriate it) for the common good.30 Property 
rights can give owners exclusive or near-exclusive rights to use 
particular, bounded geographic places. Or they can vest owners with 
specific rights to use particular places while other owners enjoy rights 
to use the same places in different ways. Property rights can vary 
greatly in duration, and owners may or may not gain rights to 
transfer their property to new owners or to shift to different uses. In 
some way, property law needs to make rights available to the first 
owners—to allocate the property—and the possible allocation 
methods are numerous.31 
These widely varied options to create private property are 
usefully compared with what is commonly thought of as the 
opposing option: government ownership with regulatory control.32 
This latter option also involves government coming up with a legal 
scheme controlling use of the landscape. To that extent, the options 
are the same. A government-run system could involve use of the 
landscape by people working for the government itself or for 
community members collectively. This option, if chosen, would 
differ noticeably from many of the private-property variants. More 
likely, though, a government would retain control but make tailored 
rights to use the landscape available to private actors, much as, on 
federal lands in the United States, grazing, mining, and timber 
harvesting are all done by private actors. When this latter approach is 
selected, the differences between the private-property and 
government-regulation options narrow further. Indeed, they can 
narrow to the point where the two options differ only in details. In 
 
 30.  I consider the many options available to lawmakers when crafting property systems in 
ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 11–
36 (2003). 
 31.  A concise summary of the issues appears in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. 
KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 393–96 (2012); 
see also id. at 312–14 for the options for resolving disputes among owners. 
 32.  The ideas set forth in this paragraph and the next are developed at length in Eric T. 
Freyfogle, Good-bye to the Public-Private Divide, in AGRARIANISM AND THE GOOD SOCIETY: LAND, 
CULTURE, CONFLICT, AND HOPE 83–106 (2007). The line is also blurred considerably in proposals 
for laws that facilitate private action to govern particular neighborhoods or landscapes. See e.g., 
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L. J. 75 (1998); Robert H. 
Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property 
Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (1999). Adding further complexity is 
the frequent existence of multiple levels of governance. Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The 
Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007 (2012). 
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both instances, laws set the terms of use rights. In both instances, 
systems are backed by state enforcement powers. In both instances, 
private actors have legally secure use rights and they are the ones 
who engage in the profit-seeking land uses. 
Indeed, when the various land-governance options are all set out 
(or a sufficient number and variety of them), they form not two 
categories of public property and private property but something like 
an unbroken continuum of rights and land-use arrangements, 
varying (on one end) from public land used only by government and 
off limits to private actors (a sensitive defense installation, for 
instance), to private land in a remote rural location with nearly no 
land-use controls and few spillover effects. In between these poles 
would be variations on the scope and nature of private use rights and 
in the retained government powers to revise the terms of the use 
rights over time and to redirect resources to different uses and users. 
Private property is based on the exercise of government power in 
the sense that laws and police are what compel people to respect one 
another’s private rights. It rests, that is, on sovereign power, not on 
some power source arising apart from government. And it is based, 
just as much as any other government regulation, on coercion. To vest 
rights in one landowner is to restrict coercively, by state action, the 
liberties of all other people.33 
V. THE CHALLENGES OF AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY 
Hardin cannot be faulted for the idea that the private-property 
remedy somehow differs in kind rather than degree from the 
regulatory option. He might be faulted, though, for not saying more 
about the grave difficulties involved in setting up any coercive 
regime, one that allows intensive uses of a landscape but keeps the 
uses within proper bounds; a regime that allows full use but 
somehow forestalls abuse. In reality, the work involved in this law-
making or norm-creating is quite considerable. It is hardly enough 
simply to draw lines on a map, dividing a landscape into shares. Far 
more labor is needed to craft workable rules and to enforce them 
overtime. The challenges in doing this are many, and they arise in 
every land and resource setting. They can be particularly acute in 
settings where nature itself is highly dynamic and when (as often) 
 
 33.  Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (2010). 
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actions by one person directly affect both other people and the 
resource itself, understood in ecological context. 
As an initial matter, it seems obligatory in any setting to start 
with the basic distinction between the legitimate use of nature and 
the misuse of it. How should lawmakers differentiate the two? This 
is, as noted, a normative task, and a challenging one when done 
wisely and morally; when it takes into account, as it should, the full 
range of factors relevant to it.34 
This line-drawing is a necessary element in any rights-allocation 
system because, for reasons mentioned, market forces and human 
nature are not such that a community can expect individual users 
voluntarily to stay on the right side of the use-abuse line. If a 
community really wants to halt misuse, then it needs to tailor use 
rights under any scheme so as to allow legitimate uses and disallow 
all misuses (Hardin’s main point). A legal scheme need not rely 
solely on prohibitions of misuse, particularly in the case of land- or 
resource-use harms that entail what might be termed carrying-
capacity harms: actions that are harmful only when too many people 
engage in them.35 In that setting and others, lawmakers could use 
other management tools, perhaps involving economic incentives, 
perhaps instead involving efforts to nurture and strengthen social 
norms.36 Still, a line must be drawn, which means, somehow, doing 
the work of drawing it. This work is likely to call for considerable 
ecological knowledge, as well as mature thought on the various 
relevant normative factors. The need for ecological knowledge in 
turn can require extensive scientific study. 
With this line-drawing done (for the time being), the next step is 
to craft use rights so that they allow land and resource uses 
consistent with it. In the case of highly varied landscapes, this will 
likely mean tailoring the use rights to nature itself so as to allow uses 
that are ecologically sound and to limit those that are not. The 
guiding principle here would be rights that are based on nature in 
the sense that they take natural features into account.37 Opposed to 
 
 34.  I explore the challenge in ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF NATURE: 
MAKING SENSE OF OUR OLDEST TASK (forthcoming University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
 35.  Hardin’s examples all qualify as actions that are harmful only when too many people 
engage in them. I consider the issue in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 221. 
 36.  A useful consideration of options is Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, 
and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land in Cultural and Psychological 
Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423. 
 37. FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 203–27. 
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this—to highlight the point—are property rights defined abstractly, 
as with the hypothetical Greenacre or Blackacre: rights defined with 
no regard for natural features or for the effects of a given resource-
use in a particular place.38 This work too may be quite challenging. 
And, again, it needs to be done under any coercive option, whether 
termed private property or government control. It needs to be done, 
that is, if the goal (as assumed) is to avoid abuse entirely and if the 
community of users is not so close-knit, and so well-guided 
internally, that individual owners (contra Hardin’s tale) can be 
counted on to avoid bad actions on their own. 
Making this tailoring job more difficult is nature’s dynamism and 
the fact that human actions themselves inevitably change the parts of 
nature being used.39 Change in physical conditions in turn means, in 
dialectical fashion, changes in the future uses that will be permissible 
under the new conditions. Also shifting will be prevailing ideas about 
good land use—about the line drawn between use and abuse—shifts 
that could occur because of new factual knowledge but could also 
occur due to evolving communal needs and values.40 The factors 
interact in a kind of multi-factor dynamism, one that can prove 
especially knotty in the case of biological resources (fish, for 
instance) where populations are subject to wide natural variations 
and where the capture of one species can distort populations of other 
species.41It can prove knotty also due to variations in weather 
patterns—drought, flooding, extreme temperatures—and to natural 
disturbance regimes such as fire. 
In some way lawmakers charged with the task of crafting private use 
rights need to take this dynamism into account. They could do so by 
erring on the side of great caution, by allowing year in and year out only 
those limited land uses that would respect the land’s ecological health 
 
 38.  I challenge this perspective in ERIC F. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING 
COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 12–26 (2007). 
 39.  The challenges posed by nature itself are considered in Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 
189 (2002). 
 40. A classic historical study of the dialectical interaction of nature and culture, and how it 
plays out in terms of property-use systems, is WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, 
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). 
 41.  These challenges and many others are considered in Boyce Thorne-Miller, Setting the 
Right Goals: Marine Fisheries and Sustainability in Large Ecosystems, in PRECAUTIONARY TOOLS FOR 
RESHAPING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 155 (NANCY J. MYERS & CAROLYN RAFFENSPERGER, 
EDS., 2006). 
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under any and all foreseeable landscape conditions. That approach, 
however, is likely to be rejected as much too cautious. The alternative is 
to allow more intensive use levels but to embed into the private rights 
some mechanism to curtail use levels when needed to respond to these 
dynamic factors. A fishery is again a good example: harvest levels need 
to vary with natural fluctuations in target-species populations. Various 
methods could be used to build-in this responsiveness. All of them, 
though, require ongoing monitoring, data collection, and adjustments 
to use levels. All of them require ongoing involvement in managing use 
levels at the landscape (or fishery) level. It is not enough under any 
option for lawmakers to set usage levels once and for all and then walk 
away. In short, a property-rights approach requires ongoing 
manipulation, just as does the regulatory option, if it is really going to 
avert overuse. 
To get to this point is to see that the property-rights and 
regulatory approaches may not be all that different. Of course they 
could be quite different in a particular setting. Lawmakers taking a 
property-rights approach could define private use-rights in clear, 
unchanging terms, without making them responsive in any way to 
shifting natural conditions. But by doing that, they give up the 
power to protect the resource against overuse. Their lawmaking 
might still reduce Hardin’s tragedy but would not eliminate it. To 
gain full protection, the property-rights approach would need to take 
shapes that rather closely resemble the regulatory option, perhaps 
quite closely. 
In the end, the work required to create a property-rights system 
might not be all that much less or different from the work needed to 
run a successful regulatory system.42 Both require extensive, sensitive 
efforts by lawmakers that attend closely to ecological facts. Both 
require lawmakers to resist pressures by user groups to authorize 
higher use-levels than are consistent with the avoidance of overuse. 
Can lawmakers be counted on to do this? Are they likely to resist 
pressures to set permissible use-levels too high? Probably not, most 
would say; surely not, others would contend. Biased lawmaking is 
indeed a danger if not a high probability. But it is a danger, we need 
to see, under both the property-rights and the regulatory approaches. 
The property-rights approach might lessen this problem somewhat 
 
 42.  I consider the similarities and identify differences in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 
174–77. 
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but the problem hardly goes away. In this light, is there reason why 
we might have greater confidence in lawmakers when they are 
specifying the elements of property rights (wearing one hat) than 
when they are crafting more overtly regulatory tools (wearing a 
different but similar hat)? Is it sensible to blast regulators as 
incompetent but then expect them (or their statute-writing 
colleagues) to do vastly better when it comes to specifying 
property rights? 
VI. ROOT CAUSES, AGAIN 
In Hardin’s simple story, the grazers overuse the pasture because 
they want to increase their individual short-term profits. That motive 
is not merely the primary one; it is, apparently, the only one, with no 
other factors in supporting roles.43 Hardin’s explanation has obvious 
merit to it; profit is patently a strong lure. But as a summary of the 
root causes of degradation—of the factors and reasons why humans 
misuse nature—it is nowhere near complete. The factors at work 
could well be quite numerous, especially when we consider many 
settings. We need to identify and trace these other causal factors 
before Hardin’s tale can stand as more than a crude explanation of 
why people act as they do. 
What other factors might be at work in a grazing story such 
as Hardin’s?44 
 
 43.  This view of human behavior is explored and criticized in Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053–55 (2000). 
 44.  The question as posed implicitly raises foundational questions: Why do humans degrade 
nature? What are the root causes of our misguided acts? The literature on the subject is far less 
developed than it should be given the importance of the questions and the need ultimately for 
solutions that address root causes. Thoughtful comments on our overall plight are offered in 
DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL 
IMAGINATION 3–63 (1993). A critique of market capitalism as a cause of degradation is presented in 
FRED MAGDOFF & JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER, WHAT EVERY ENVIRONMENTALIST NEEDS TO KNOW 
ABOUT CAPITALISM (2011). I develop my views on root causes in FREYFOGLE, supra note 34. 
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One possibility, already mentioned, is that a grazer might act in 
ignorance, whether about the carrying capacity of the land or about 
the numbers and grazing plans of fellow grazers. Hardin looks down 
on his created scene from above, knowing all. Grazers on the ground 
might know a lot less. Related to this, the grazer might disagree 
about what qualifies as overgrazing—or, more generally, about 
where to draw the line between legitimate use and abuse. 
As for the selfish drive for short-term profits, an individual grazer 
might be inclined to resist it. But what is the consequence for an 
individual grazer who refrains from adding more cows? If the 
consequence is that the grazer thereby improves pasture conditions 
then the grazer might hold back. But to bring about Hardin’s 
tragedy we do not need every grazer to be selfish. Not every grazer 
needs to make the calculation that Hardin presumes. We probably 
need only a few grazers, maybe just one. One aggressive grazer alone 
might add enough animals to degrade the entire pasture.45 
This possibility gives reason to modify Hardin’s simplistic story. 
A conscientious grazer who wants to avoid overgrazing and is willing 
to do his part is put in a bind. Yes, the grazer can refrain from 
adding animals. But if the tragedy is going to take place anyway, if 
other grazers can ruin the land without his help, what is the benefit? 
There no longer is the tradeoff of either higher short-term profits 
and a degraded pasture or lower profits and a healthier pasture. The 
landscape will decline in any event. So what is the point of 
holding back? 
A grazer who appraises the situation this way and then, perhaps 
with resignation, goes ahead to add cattle, is not acting selfishly, not 
in any full sense. His situation is akin to that of the nature lover who 
wants to see a wilderness area left untouched but has no power to 
keep others from altering it. The person might then go ahead and 
invade the wilderness, despite wanting it protected, simply because 
others will do so anyway. To refrain might be virtuous in the sense of 
reflecting good character. But it is not ethically required under any 
ethical system based either on rights or consequences.46 
 
 45. Hardin introduced this line of reasoning in the context of population growth to explain 
why the challenge could not be met simply by appealing to the consciences of individuals as such. 
Hardin, supra note 1, at 1246–47. 
 46.  The various strands of ethical thought relating to our uses of nature are considered and 
synthesized in a dated but still useful source, BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS (1991). 
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To these possible motivations for overgrazing we can quickly add 
others, many of them that also explain abusive practices by private 
landowners.47 A grazer could simply be short-sighted and not care 
about the future or could use a high discount rate that reduces the 
weight given to future harms when compared with present gains. 
The simple fact that the grazer is willing to push the land to its limits 
to meet human wants (rather than acting more cautiously), and the 
fact that he views land and animals as objects of manipulation (and 
not, in the case of the cattle, as fellow creatures), also play 
explanatory roles in the chain of events. As best we can tell, Hardin’s 
grazers view their landscape simply as a place to raise cattle; it is not a 
multiple-use land that might produce varied benefits. As for the 
always-important economics, we know nothing about the grazers 
and how they are faring. Might they need extra money to feed 
hungry families or to pay impatient tax collectors? Knowing as little 
as we do about the context, it is presumptuous to guess motives and 
judge conduct. Starving people do not steal food because they 
are selfish. 
Another key part of this whole tragic saga, again implicit in it but 
not highlighted, has to do with the market in which these grazers are 
apparently embedded. A grazer who raises ever more cattle to make 
money is likely raising them to sell. To note the presence of a market 
and the chance to make money in it is to bring in another key causal 
factor. Take the market away and the overgrazing might even end.48 
Then we have the question that has loomed above Hardin’s tale 
from the beginning, the question that should have been, for decades 
now, at the center of discussions about Hardin’s tragedy. If his 
grazers could have come together collectively to develop a 
management plan, benefiting all of them, why did they not do it? 
Why did they continue competing as autonomous individuals rather 
than cooperating for shared gain? In an important sense, the real 
cause of the tragedy is precisely this: the failure of the grazers to 
communicate, to get together, and to act sensibly. So why did they 
fail to cooperate? 
To raise this issue is to highlight yet again how ignorant we 
are about this simple grazing commons and to see how this 
 
 47. FREYFOGLE, supra note 23, at 26–42. 
 48.  The argument is developed in MAGDOFF & FOSTER, supra note 44, and CHRIS 
WILLIAMS, ECOLOGY AND SOCIALISM: SOLUTIONS TO CAPITALIST ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 226 (2010) 
(“[I]t is the economic system that dictates that nonsustainability is rational, not people.”). 
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ignorance can (and does) readily lead to mistaken assumptions. 
As possible answers to these questions—as explanations why 
competing grazers might fail to communicate and work 
together—it is easy to round up some likely suspects:49 
• The bad communication could stem from differences 
among the grazers themselves: differences in 
language, ethnicity, religious, race, and so on. 
• It could be due to membership in different political 
or tribal groups that do not get along. 
• The grazing region could be (probably is) a 
borderland where group competition plays out; 
historically these are the grazing regions most 
often misused. 
• Perhaps the prevailing political and social culture is 
weakened by oppression with talk among people 
stifled by fears of informers, secret police or 
organized crime. 
• If grazers are taxed for each animal they own they 
may just refuse to talk about their herd sizes and to 
question others about theirs. 
• Finally, the grazers might simply feel helpless and 
resigned. They may assume that any arrangement they 
concoct will collapse under pressure from outside 
powers—from powerful cattle buyers (global 
corporations?), for instance, driven by neo-
liberal agendas.50 
All of these possibilities need to be placed on the table as causes 
of landscape tragedies. Tellingly, none of them appears in Hardin’s 
 
 49.  A thoughtful inquiry is Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to 
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000). 
 50.  Such fears might be well grounded in the realities of the settings in which interested 
parties come together. Discussions could be skewed to favor particular interests that wield 
disproportionate power. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combatting the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005). Similarly, the processes of engagement could be 
ones that are so drawn out, and so costly for the participants, that only the best-funded interests can 
stay engaged. John D. Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative Watershed 
Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559 (2001). More generally, 
cooperation that takes place through institutions is subject to the limitations of such institutions; the 
topic is surveyed in Daniel H. Cole, The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 383.  
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simple story. For us to interject any of them requires that we add 
facts to his tale (thereby making it more plausible). There is one big 
causal factor, though, that is present in Hardin’s narrative without 
any need to add complexity. This is the inclination of his fictional 
characters simply to look after themselves as individuals, ignoring 
everyone else. Each grazer, Hardin tells us, responds solely to the 
costs and benefits he incurs as an individual. It is a culture of go-it-
alone; a culture in which individuals look at their neighbors as 
competitors, not colleagues. As Chris Williams has pointed out, 
Hardin presents this motive as “a transhistorical fact.” He describes 
as rational “the very thing that traditional herdsmen and peasants 
sharing ‘common’ lands historically avoid.”51 
For the grazers in Hardin’s story to act as they should have, for 
them to have come together and developed a pasture-management 
scheme, they needed to live and work within a culture that expected 
and nurtured cooperation.52 They required a home culture in which 
people acted as citizens or community members as well as market 
participants. Further, they required a culture—if they were to sustain 
healthy pastures—that generated and shared ecological wisdom 
about landscapes and that included vocabulary suitable for talking 
about it. The ideal of land health, or something like it, would need 
to stand as a matter of common concern, suitable for common 
resolution. Finally, the culture needed to view collective action, 
through some sort of governmental means, as a legitimate way for 
people to pursue their aims. It could not be a culture in which 
people treated government as the enemy. It could not be a culture in 
which land abusers could ward off critics by raising high the shield of 
individual liberty.53 
 
 51. WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at 43–44.  
 52.  This point, and those made in the next three sentences, appear prominently in the many 
writings of Wendell Berry, e.g., Conservation and Local Economy, in WENDELL BERRY, SEX, 
ECONOMY, FREEDOM & COMMUNITY 3–18 (1993). 
 53.  Beyond these points, users of the commons would typically need to develop governance 
arrangements that responded to the various forces that could undercut successful commons 
management. The traits of successful commons-management arrangements are surveyed in OSTROM, 
supra note 15, at 58–102. Ostrom usefully probes the complex motives of individual users of 
commons in A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1 (1998). 
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A land-respecting culture can certainly embrace private 
property.54 But it cannot view private rights as so strong and 
inflexible that cooperation among owners occurs only by 
unanimous agreement. If private rights are inflexible, if grazers can 
halt overgrazing only when everyone agrees, then a single dissenter 
can frustrate everything. In short, strong private rights—whether 
or not phrased in property terms—can quickly cause ruin, even 
when nearly everyone wants to avoid it. And it is hardly fair to say 
that people who value land health simply need to pay abusers 
enough to get them to stop. Why should they bear such a burden?55 
The larger issue here, to reiterate, has to do with the root causes 
of tragedy-inducing behavior. This tragedy, like all environmental 
problems, is brought on by human action. The search to learn why 
people misbehave should thus be central to any inquiry into our 
environmental plight. Hardin cannot be faulted much for largely 
ignoring the issue; for assuming simplistically that overgrazing stems 
from one factor. But commentary on it, and certainly commentary 
on our environmental plight generally, has been much weakened by a 
failing to put this issue front and center, although important 
exceptions, to be sure, exist.56 Yes, when a market exists and people 
desire to get ahead they take steps that make them money. To that 
extent Hardin’s tale is well grounded. But in a culture that honors 
land health—one that facilitates discussion on key normative issues, 
that encourages cooperation as well as competition, and that views 
government as the people’s agent for shared work—the profit motive 
might fade in significance.57 
 
 54. Wendell Berry, Private Property and the Common Wealth, in BERRY, ANOTHER TURN OF 
THE CRANK 46–63 (1995). 
 55.  The issue is considered in John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to 
Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES &ENVTL. L. 1 (2005). Payment to land owners to 
avoid harmful activities also undercuts the moral legitimacy of private property rights in nature. 
FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 105–30. 
 56.  Still high on the list of penetrating cultural critiques is Aldo Leopold’s classic work, A 
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949), an extended meditation on the 
new ways of seeing and valuing nature that people needed to embrace if they were to live well on 
land in the long run. Perhaps Leopold’s most concise depiction of this new world view appears in his 
The Farmer as a Conservationist, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY 
ALDO LEOPOLD 255 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott, eds., 1991) (originally published 1939). 
Leopold’s thought is most carefully surveyed in JULIANNE LUTZ NEWTON, ALDO LEOPOLD’S 
ODYSSEY: REDISCOVERING THE AUTHOR OF A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (2006). 
 57.  A vibrant civil society is likely also a prerequisite. Julianne Lutz Newton & William C. 
Sullivan, Nature, Culture, and Civil Society, 1 J. CIV. SOC’Y 195 (2005). 
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Today’s culture of liberal individualism includes and gives 
priority to cultural elements that are root causes of ecological 
degradation.58 It features cultural elements that foster land-use 
tragedies while frustrating efforts to halt them. Particularly in its 
liberty-loving, anti-government forms, liberal individualism 
undercuts efforts to see landscapes as ecological wholes and to think 
normatively about their conditions and prospects. It holds high the 
rights of individuals to go it alone like Hardin’s grazers so long as 
they respect the rights of others to go it alone also. As Hardin 
illustrated, this is a culture that leads readily if not inexorably to 
disaster. Responsible libertarians, to be sure, call for compliance with 
laws, property law especially. But the culture they press forward is a 
culture that frustrates good lawmaking, including, importantly, the 
lawmaking required to come up with new well-crafted 
property rights. 
When mutual coercion is the only solution to avoid tragedy, as it 
is in setting after setting, a culture that despises and resists such 
coercion—a culture that presses hard to keep it from happening and, 
when it does take place, views the lawmaking arena as simply another 
venue for individuals as such to get ahead—is a culture that is driven 
to ruin. The work of mutual coercion, of crafting collective 
management schemes, is difficult even when all participants support 
it and bring to the table their best inner selves. When many of them 
instead do all that they can to undercut it and/or to manipulate 
rule-making to benefit themselves—when the culture they embrace 
views such self-seeking behavior as simply vigorous competition—
then the path to hope becomes yet darker and more treacherous. 
VII. NAMING THE TRAGEDY 
The title Garret Hardin gave to his essay did not really name the 
tragedy that took place in his grazing landscape (or in his 
overpopulated world). Rather, his title seemed to identity where the 
tragedy occurred. But Hardin does imply that his tragedy unfolds 
because the pasture is not governed by an effective land-
management regime, by some version of mutual coercion mutually 
agreed upon. It is the absence of good laws that is the problem, and 
a new legal arrangement, he tells us, is the only solution. In that 
light, his title identifies not just the place of the tragedy but also its 
 
 58. FREYFOGLE, supra note 34. 
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cause. Government (assuming it exists) is to blame for not 
adequately controlling the self-seeking individuals. 
One might readily object to this shifting of causal responsibility. 
A well-constructed legal regime is the solution to the problem, not 
its cause. The grazers bring on the overgrazing themselves. The true 
causes of the tragedy are the forces and factors that lead the grazers 
to act as they do rather than in other, more responsible ways. 
Government is not to blame, nor, really, is the commons itself, even 
if we could somehow view nature as an active agent in the unfolding 
drama. When the commons is used by people who collectively want 
to use it well and who have the knowledge, skills, and opportunity to 
do so, then (and only then) does the outcome brighten. 
If we want an apt name for Hardin’s narrative, then, we need to 
look in another direction. An apt title would be one that summed-
up, in a few words, the key cause of the misbehavior. As for that, the 
possible titles are many, and it might prove helpful to debate their 
relative merits as an avenue for probing the likely causal factors. 
One place to turn for a new name is to Bernard Mandeville’s 
eighteenth-century classic work, much liked by libertarians and 
market enthusiasts, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick 
Benefits.59 Mandeville was an early advocate of the view, later 
connected with Adam Smith, that linked energetic money-making 
efforts to economic growth that benefited the public generally. 
Mandeville’s thinking, of course, is best understood in the context of 
his worldview and its distinct (and now ignored) assumptions about 
a binding moral order. But we can put his age aside and take 
inspiration from his title. Hardin’s tale might be termed “The Fable 
of the Cows: Or Private Vices, Public Decline.” 
As noted, the overgrazing in Hardin’s tale is also closely linked, 
essentially so perhaps, to the unmentioned market in cattle. Take 
away that market, take away the grazers’ tendency to view cattle as 
capital assets, and the overgrazing would diminish if not end. We 
could thus consider, as a second option for the title, “The Tragedy of 
Market Capitalism.”60 If selected, this phrasing might prompt readers 
to see links between tragedies of the type Hardin described and 
 
 59.  BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK 
BENEFITS (J. Johnson, ed., 6th ed. 1732). The volume remains in print from various publishers. It 
originally appeared in differing editions between 1714 and 1732. 
 60.  The argument is made by various writers including MAGDOFF & FOSTER, supra note 44, 
and WILLIAMS, supra note, at 48.  
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other instances of wastefulness and degradation brought on by the 
vigorous pursuit of profits. Detroit, Michigan, could supply ready 
facts for several illustrations. Variations of this title could draw 
attention to particular elements of the market, to its 
commodification of nature, for instance, or to the short-term 
perspective that it invites and rewards. 
One might be tempted as a further option to choose a title that 
gets at the selfish individualism involved in Hardin’s tragedy, at what 
might be termed the cussed individualism. But we need to be careful 
with this phrasing, tempting though it is. In Hardin’s tale, the 
grazers as individuals would have been better off had they worked 
together. The problem—in this setting, though not in all—was thus 
not the grazers’ presumed desire to flourish economically. It was, 
more exactly, their failure to pursue that goal by working in tandem. 
An accurate name would need to get at this particular aspect of 
individualism, the “go-it-alone” version of individualism, the kind of 
individualism that fails to recognize how a responsible person plays 
many social roles with expectations of good conduct attached 
to them. 
Two years before Hardin’s article came out, the economist 
Alfred Kahn wrote a rather similar article that highlighted the same 
problem. Kahn’s article drew less popular attention, very possibly, 
one might guess, because he phrased the issue in a way that many 
readers liked far less. Kahn’s essay was entitled “The Tyranny of 
Small Decisions.”61 It highlighted how individuals who made 
decisions in isolation, even acting in economically rational ways, 
could drag down the communities to which they belonged. When 
people stood apart, when they chose or were compelled to act in 
isolation, their individual “small” decisions brought harm to the 
whole. This title was later picked up by an ecologist, William Odum, 
who explained how it linked to ecological degradation.62 
Kahn’s title was far more apt than Hardin’s in terms of 
highlighting the cause of the bad outcome. It pointed a finger 
more directly at the individual grazers—it was their decisions that 
brought on the harm, not any failing of government—and 
emphasized that the problem had to do with their isolation or 
 
 61. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the 
Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23 (1966). 
 62. William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 
BIOSCIENCE 728 (1982). 
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autonomy. So long as the grazers acted alone, not together, their 
decisions were bad ones. Kahn’s title, then, could be recycled. 
Hardin’s tale is very much one in which small decisions exerted 
destructive power; it too showed the tyranny that they could 
bring on. 
Small decisions become more likely when a landscape is divided 
into many small pieces and when management of the pieces is turned 
over to individual owners. As Hardin points out, the division of the 
landscape into private shares might well diminish the harms that 
unfold in a pasture that is completely uncontrolled.63 Privatization is 
a step in a good direction. But it is only a step and it is unlikely to 
sustain the landscape’s long-term productivity. For reasons 
mentioned, fragmentation can leave key problems unaddressed. And 
it can make many forms of good land use more difficult. To get at 
these problems we might then select as a new title something like 
“The Tragedy of Fragmentation.”64 Like the Tragedy of Market 
Capitalism, this title also has broader usage. It can refer, not just to 
the fragmentation of landscapes in physical senses, but to other 
forms of fragmentation: to views of nature as a collection of pieces 
and parts rather than integrated ecological systems; to views of 
humans as distinct autonomous beings detached from social bonds 
and surrounding communities; to the disconnection of the present 
generation from past and future ones; and to the division of life 
forms into distinct categories with widely varied moral value. As a 
title, The Tragedy of Fragmentation more directly engages issues of 
ontology. It challenges views of being that emphasize the organic 
parts and discount the wholes that they help form together with the 
emergent properties that arise only at such higher levels.65 
In the end, however, perhaps the most apt new title for Hardin’s 
tale would be one that points as distinctly as possible at the reasons 
why the grazers might fail to get together to cooperate. Cooperation 
alone is certainly not enough to avoid bad outcomes; the grazers 
could cooperate to exploit the commons with zest, take their profits 
and run. Cooperation thus needs to work hand in hand with sound 
 
 63.  Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245. 
 64.  I use the term and elaborate the idea in FREYFOGLE, supra note 30, at 157–78. 
 65.  The point served as a central theme of Leopold’s Almanac, beginning with two much-
quoted sentences from the book’s foreword: “We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity 
belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with 
love and respect.” LEOPOLD, supra note 56, at viii. 
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values, with extensive ecological knowledge, and with a form of 
humility that reflects human ignorance about changing nature. But 
the cooperation nonetheless remains the key. The grazers simply 
must get together, plain and simple. If external forces keep the 
people apart, then we need to point to those forces and make clear 
their costly consequences. But if as usual (one suspects) the grazers 
are kept apart because of reasons internal to their membership, 
because of the flawed culture in which they operate, then the name 
for the tragedy should point in their direction. 
In some way, a name that gets at this root cause should hold 
high the need for the grazers to think of themselves as bound 
together in a community, or more exactly, as embedded within at 
least two communities, the social and the ecological. Practically 
speaking a good grazing arrangement will respect nature as an 
interconnected, interdependent community of life. Humans will 
appear embedded in that community and ultimately dependent on 
its long-term health. In social terms, the grazers need to see similarly 
that they belong to human social networks and depend on the 
strength and good content of those networks. Fully good land use is 
possible only when the grazers recognize these communities and, 
having recognized them, work to sustain them. In that sense, we can 
rightly view the health of grazing region as a condition or property 
that emerges only at the community level, only when both the land 
community and the human social community are healthy and 
functioning well.66 Good land use is thus an emergent property, 
generated at the community level and only at that level. Seeing this, 
we might then choose as our title The Tragedy of Weak 
Communities or The Tragedy of Incomplete Communities. 
These various names each have appeal. Perhaps they could be 
used somehow in tandem. Yet one more name can usefully go on 
this list, a title that seems most apt in the modern age, most apt in a 
culture guided by the kind of libertarian, free-market ideology that 
has gained such prominence in the United States of late. 
The liberal trajectory of the Western World over the past three 
centuries has brought substantial gains in many realms, of that there 
is little doubt.67 In economic realms it has fostered substantial 
 
 66. Wendell Berry makes the point, which is central to his writings, in Health Is Membership, 
in BERRY, supra note 54, at 86.  
 67. I develop the ideas in this paragraph and the next in FREYFOGLE, supra note 34. 
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increases in economic productivity, sizeable enough overall to exceed 
in value the considerable associated costs. In social realms liberalism 
has brought great gains for the downtrodden and unfairly burdened. 
In political realms it has spread political power through increases in 
suffrage. Driving much of this has been a commitment to rationalism 
and empirically grounded science along with a wide-ranging 
willingness to challenge and revise inherited understandings. 
Providing the polestar has been the liberated individual, increasingly 
free to develop and embrace values as she sees fit. This liberal social 
thought did not have to carry over into the ways people viewed 
nature. But to some extent it did. Nature, too, came to seem more 
fragmented and competition based. This liberal view of nature in 
turn made it easier to relax traditional limits on economic enterprise. 
When we revisit Hardin’s tale in light of this long-term cultural 
trajectory, we can see that the bad-acting grazers that he describes 
are in fact familiar characters. They are exemplars of the fully 
liberated individual, the individual freed of all social and economic 
constraints and freed too of ethical and religious norms that might 
inhibit the overgrazing (of the type Adam Smith presumed). Setting 
to one side possible external causes, it was this full-bore liberation of 
the individual that brought destruction to the landscape. In Hardin’s 
fictional world all senses of community had disappeared. All felt 
constraints were relaxed. The liberated individual grazers could 
proceed as they saw fit, pursuing short-term profits and degrading 
their natural home. 
Thus we might consider, as a final title, “The Tragedy of 
Liberalism Taken Too Far.” 
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